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No. 82-1327-CFX
Western Oil & Gas

v.

Ass' ~il

companies)

....
No. 82-1511-CFX

J

California ~
v.

Watt, ~
SUMMARY:

In Nos. 82-1326 & 82-1327, petrs contend that
/{

L\

CA9 erred in finding that an out e r continental shelf lease ~ ale
Jt
,,
is a federal activity "directly affecting the coastal zone" under

-

......

------~

§307 (c) (1)

............... ~

of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.

In No.

82-1511, a conditional cross-petition, cross-petrs contend that
CA9 erred in its construction of the phrase "to the maximum extent practicable" in §307 (c) (1).
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

The Coastal Zone Management

~

Act of 1972 (CZMA) is designed to help preserve natural resources

-----.

~

in coastal zones.

The Act encourages each coastal state to adopt

a coastal management plan.

To obtain federal approval,

such a

plan must adequately consider the "national interest" and "the
views of the Federal agencies principally affected by such program."

16

u.s.c.

§§1455 (c) (8), 1456 (b).

Once a state plan has

been approved by the Secretary of Commerce, the Federal Gover·nment must take account of the plan as follows:
"Each federal agency conducting or supporting

activities hdirectl~ affecting ' the coastal zone

shall conduc t or support t hOse activities in a
manner which is, to the ''max,i_!llum extent... Era_£tiqab l e ~\ consistent with approved s Ea £e management
programs."
§307 (c) (1),
16
u.s.c.
§1456 (c) (1).
The issue presented by the main petitions is the meaning of "di- ~
rectly affecting;" the issue presented by the cross-petition is
the meaning of "to the maximum extent practicable."

u•4cc.c..,

3.

j..~

This
(DOI)

litigation concerns

the Department of

the

Interior's ~

proposed sale of leases for exploratory drilling for oil

and gas off

the

whether

proposed

the

coast of

California.

sale

is

The

consistent

principal
with

the

issue

is

federal approval of the CCMP.
v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889

See American Petroleum Institute

(CD Cal. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 1306

In April 1981 the State and various political sub-

divisions brought suit against DO! and the Bureau of Land Management,

'(
'

claiming that the sale

c~uld

not go forward until DOI had

made a determination of whether the sale was consistent with the
CCMP.

A similar suit was filed by several environmental groups.

WOGA and various oil companies

intervened in both suits, which

were consolidated.
The dispute concerns Lease Sale 53, which consists of 243
designated tracts of the outer continental shelf in five different basins off the California coast,
Basin

including the Santa Maria

(which extends from Point Sur in Monterey County south to

Point Conception

in Santa Barbara County).

In 1978,

following

proceedings involving public participation by oil companies, governmental agencies,

environmental groups, etc., DO! announced a

tentative tract selection for the sale.

The final environmental

impact statement was released in September 1980.
....,

~

...............

~

(Petr Western Oil and Gas Ass'n (WOGA) ~ ·

and the American Petroleum Institute unsuccessfully sued to block

(CA9 1979).)

(4

California j?~

Coastal Management Plan (CCMP), which was approved by the Secretary of Commerce in 1977.

~

---~~

....

....-_....

...

The

u.s.

Geo-

logical Survey estimated that the Santa Maria Basin had a reserve
of 794 million barrels of oil.

tt.

(

On October 16, 1980, Secretary Andrus issued a proposed notice of sale for Lease Sale 53, but covering only the Santa Maria

(115

Basin

of

the

243

tracts).

In

July

1980

the

California

Coastal Commission had asked the Secretary to submit a "cons istency determination" pursuant to §307 (c) (1) of the CZMA

i.e.,

a determination that the sale was consistent with the CCMP

..

the time of the issuance of the proposed notice of sale.

~ ~

preleasing

-

zone,
___.

therefore

at
But on

October 22, 1980, the Secretary not1fied the Commission that the
activities

and

qui red.
that,

-

had
that

In December

1980

no

"direct

effects"

on

-the

coastal

no consistency determination was
the Commission adopted

to be consistent with the CCMP,

a

re-

resolution

32 tracts located in the

northern portion of the Santa Maria Basin should be deleted from

('--

the lease sale.

(The SG and WOGA state that California was con,

'

cerned primarily with possible harm to the habitat of the south-

~n k,.e a ~t t:._e~:
~ about negative

~

Califor;ia states that

of sale,

Sale 53.

vv~

effects on fishing, port access, tourism, etc.)

In February 1981

~ notice

it was concerned as well

which

~ew

DOI Secretary Watt issued a

included

the other -;-: r

revise~

basin~

~

In April 1981 Governor Brown of California reiterated ~

that 32 tracts should be eliminated from the Santa Maria Basin ~
leasing.
Sale 53

The same ' month Secretary Watt decided to divide Lease
into two sales:

the Santa Maria Basin tracts would be

,/

sold in May

1981~

and the other basins would be leased later.

He

stated that his determination that the entire Santa Maria Basin
should be leased, despite California's objections, was based on a
finding

l.

of overriding

national

interest.

The

final

notice of

~.

(

sale was issued on April 27, 1981.
Cal.iforn ~

immediately

sought

an

injunction

in

C.D.

Cal.

The DC (Pfaelzer, J.) allowed bids to be received and opened, but
on May 27 preliminarily enjoined DOI from accepting or rejecting
bids or

issuing leases.

In August 1981, on motions for summary

judgment, the court ruled on the merits.
the Vo<? ruled for DOI.

-

On ,most of the issues,

(These were claims under the National En-

~

vironmental Policy Act,

the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,

the Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act;
none of these is presented for
for the State on

~t

review here.)

th~ Q1a !,m y_nd_gr ~ 307 (c)

th~ led

(1) of the CZMA.

The DC

6C:::::.

::!n:e~~:v:::sc:::::::::::a:::a:: )

oil and gas development."

(SG's Pet. at 46a.)

t h e bids and ordered the deposits returned.
...........

...

The court voided

It also enjoined any

.......

further action with respect to leasing "until such time as de ~~ :L
~f.-.tZ.nt:..l- ~-~.~
dants comply with the requirements of the [CZMA] by conducting a
A.;

~

•• -

consistency determination on the tracts at issue and by conducting all activities on these
California's
......

Coastal

t racts in- a manner consistent with

Management

..........

~

order was stayed pending appeal.

.

V' cA9 affirmed.
that supported the

Plan."

(Id.,

at

80a.)

This

,,,.

It agreed with the DC that the only statute
· S ~ te's

·,.

position was

the CZMA.

----

centered on the meaning of "directly affecting."

The dispute
CA9

rejected

the Government's argument that the direct effects of a lease sale
do not include subsequent steps such as actual oil production:
"[D]ecisions made at the lease sale stage in
this case establish the basic scope and char-

b.

I

ter for subsequent development and production.
Prior to the sale of leases, critical decisions are made as to the size and location of ·
the tracts, the timing of the sale, and the
stipulations to which the leases would be subject.
These choices determine, or at least
influence, whether oil will be transported by
pipeline or ship, which areas of the coastal
zone will be exposed to danger, the flow of
vessel traffic, and the siting of on-shore
construction.
Under these circumstances Lease Sale 53 established the first link in the chain of
events which couid Iea'd toproauctton ""'a nd development of oil and gas on the individual
tracts leased. This is a Earticularly significant ~ because at ' this stage all- the
tracts can be considered together, taking into
account the cumulative effects of the entire
lease sale, whereas at the later stages consistency determinations would be made on a
tract-by-tract basis."
(Id., at 13a.)

\

CA9 made

the

following

additional arguments

I

in support of

~

this holding:

-The purpose of CZMA is to encourage federal-state cooperation,

and "[t]o effectuate this purpose, the state must be per-

mitted to become involved at an early stage."
-This
history."

approach

is

"not

Although

there

inconsistent

is

little

(Id., at 14a.)

with

the

indication

legislative

what

Congress

meant in passing §307(c) (1) in 1972, statements in House and Senate

reports

state

in

1976

and

1980

indicate

...

involvement at an early stage.

that Congress

intended

Although such subsequent

legislative statements are not conclusive,

they should be given

"appropriate weight" -- and here they deserve "substantial weight
because

they appear

to us to serve

bet. ~er

the purposes of the

CZMA than would the narrower interpretation urged by the federal
appellants."

C /19 T

( Id. , at 15a-16a.)

-The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

I

is

the

agency charged with

promulgating

regulations

under

•

the

CZMA, and until May 1981 it took the view that final notices of
outer continental shelf lease sales were subject to the consistency requirement of §307 (c) (1}.

(In 1981 the NOAA filed a no-

tice of proposed rulemaking to define "directly affecting" in the
way the Government defines it here, but this rulemaking was suspended following the DC decision in this case and following negative reactions from Congress.}
-There is no inconsistency with the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act

(OCSLA}, as amended in 1978.

It is true that §19 of

that Act requires DOI to consider state governors'

recommenda-

tions regarding the "size, timing, and location" of lease sales.
43

(

u.s.c.

§1345(a}.

But requiring DOI also to make a consistency

determination under the CZMA will not be duplicative, for the two
statutes have different purposes:
gas development,

the OCSLA focuses on oil and

the CZMA on environmental concerns.

Moreover,

the OCSLA has a savings clause that expressly states that it does
not modify the CZMA.
If

Having determined that §307(c} (1}

\,

applied at the lease sale

stage, CA9 then turned to the question of what it would mean for
the Government to act "consistently" with the State's plan.
Government argued that the DC' s

The

injunction required the Govern-

ment to conform its sale to the CCMP.

Assuming arguendo that the

DC had imposed this requirement, CA9 rejected it:
"The statute does not provide that a state's
plan takes precedence when it would preclude
the federal activity, or even that the federal
activi.ty must be as consistent with the plan
as is possible.
It only provides that the
activity be consistent to the maximum extent

8.

practicable.
The Act is not explicit with
respect to the location of final authority to
determine whether the required consistency · )
exists. We believe such authority must reside
in the Executive Branch of the federal government subject, of course, to such judicial review as is appropriate."
(Id., at 19a (emphasis in original).)
The court noted that the CZMA provides for mediation by the Secretary of Commerce of disputes between DOI and a State as to the
"consistency" of a federal activity with a State's plan.

Finally, ~A9

discussed the issue of remedy.

"The premise on

which [the DC's] order rests appears to be that California's view
of consistency ultimately will be controlling.
with this premise."

(Id., at 23a.)

We do not agree

Therefore, CA9 affirmed only

that portion of the order requiring a consistency determination
('--

before the sale.

The CA vacated the DC's order that the bids be

voided and the deposits be returned.

The court retained juris-

diction over the appeal.
CONTENTIONS:
Petrs

-- CA9

A. The Main Petitions

effectively has deleted

-----

-

the

from the statutory phrase "directly affecting."
---~

pretation,

..,.

this word simply has

Government's

"plain meaning"

no

.....

meaning.

argument

a

term "directly"
Under its inter-

The DC called the

"subterfuge,"

and CA9

said a "narrow definition" would be inconsistent with the purpose
of the Act.

But the fact is that the word "direct" has a common-

sense and restricted meaning.

For example, "(t]he word 'direct'

implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed shall
operate proximately -- not mediately, remotely, or collaterally -

to produce the effect."

238, 307 (1936).

Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,

298 U.S.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that NEPA reg-

':J.

ulations define "direct effects" as those "which are caused by
the action and occur at the same time or place," whereas "indirect effects" are those "reasonably foreseeable" effects that are
"caused by the action" but "are later in time or farther removed
in distance."

40 C.F.R. §1508.8.

Under this type of definition,

any oil and gas development that ultimately may occur is not a
direct effect of the lease sale itself.

The plain meaning of the

statute therefore should have been followed.

CA9 1 s reliance on

the gratuitous construction in the 1980 congressional reports was
erroneous.
CA9 1 s decision also disrupts Congress 1

carefully designed

scheme for the development of outer continental shelf resources.
.

( '----...--

Under §307(c) (3) (B) of the CZMA, federal licensees or permittees
must supply consistency certifications for any "activity affecting land or water uses in the coastal zone."

If the State vetoes

such a certification, the application must be rejected, unless
the Secretary of Commerce determines to override the veto based
on a finding that the activity is consistent with the state plan
or

is

in

§1456 (c) (3).

the

interest

Thus,

before any activity

of

national

there must

security.

16

u.s.c.

be a consistency determination

is undertaken by the licensees.

And the

OCSLA makes clear that such a consistency determination is required prior

to either exploration,

production or development, 43

u.s .c.

43

u.s.c.

§§1351 (d),

§1340(c) (2),
(h) (1) (B).

or
Ac-

cordingly, there is no need for a consistency determination be(~

fore leasing.

Indeed, at that stage there simply is insufficient

information on which to base a consistency determination, for the

..&..V

o

1

would-be lessee has not yet received its authorization to survey
the area.

For that reason, Congress expressly rejected an amend-

ment that would have put the word "lease" into §307(c) (3).
Moreover, in 1978 Congress rewrote the OCSLA to promote "the
swift, orderly and efficient exploitation of our almost untapped
domestic oil and gas resources in the Outer Continental Shelf."
Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Foundation, 454
(1981).

u.s.

151, 154, n.

2

The whole point was to divide the process into discrete

stages.
"Under the amended OCSLA, a lease does not
authorize the lessee to explore, develop or
produce oil and gas.
To engage in these activities, the lessee must seek separate federal approvals, first to explore for oil and gas
and later to develop and produce the resource.
As restricted by the OCSLA, a lease is a property interest that only entitles the holder to
conduct certain preliminary surveys prior to
submitting an exploration plan for approval.
The 'direct' effects of a lease sale, therefore, are extremely limited, and do not include the effects of potential exploration,
development and production activities
for
which the lessee may eventually obtain approval."
(SG's Pet. at 15.)
This

decision will

invite

litigation at

the

lease

which is precisely what the OCSLA meant to discourage.

stage,
Indeed,

offshore lease sales repeatedly have been challenged.
Finally,

the decision may severely disrupt a wide range of

federal activities.
~

Twenty-eight states have coastal management

plans that have been approved by the Federal Government.

Since

§307 (c) (1)

now must be satisfied whenever a federal agency "sets

in motion

a

chain of

events

that

may

lead

to

impacts

on

the

s edt

~ !:!~

coastal zone," there are many federal activities that may be af-- ~
fected.

(Id., at 20 n. 31.)

~.

..L..Le

{

Resps -- [For the most part, resps make the same basic argume ~

(See pp. 5-7 supra.)

Therefore, I will summa-

rize only their addi tiona! arguments and the points they emphasize.]
Petrs err in suggesting that under CA9's interpretation everything will become a "direct effect."

For example, "if a fed-

eral agency were to impose a restriction on foreign oil imports,
one might well hypothesize

'effects'

on a state's coastal zone

from the resulting inducement for additional domestic OCS oil and
gas production.

However, that kind of effect is one which clear-

ly operates 'indirectly.'"

(Brief for Resps at 10.)

The lease sale stage is the only stage at which federal activities are involved in outer continental shelf oil development.
At

subsequent

stages,

only

industry

licensees

take

action.

Therefore, if petrs' view is adopted, "the 'federal activity' in
the OCS process would never be subjected to review for consistency.

Petitioners' argument fails to recognize the important deci-

sions made at the lease sale stage and runs counter to the case
law requiring environmental

revie~

a phased decisionmaking process."

at the earliest stages of such
(Id., at 17.)

It also is noteworthy that the Department of Justice in 1979
rendered an opinion to DOI stating that §307(c) (1)
lease sales.

did apply to

This is the same view adopted by NOAA and by Con-

gress in the 1980 legislative reports.
This decision will not have far-reaching consequences.
(

In-

deed, "it is certainly arguable that there will be less delay and
disruption of OCS leasing

if state management programs are ap-

12.

plied in §307(c) (1) consistency review at the lease sale stage,
••• than if the states are relegated to review of individual exploration and development plans under §307(c) (3) at a later stage
of the process."

(Id., at 27 (emphasis in original).)

Petrs' Reply -- Resps' suggestion that the requirement here
is merely one of "environmental review" is wrong.
cy requirement

is

substantive,

not procedural,

The consistenand

this means

that there will be continuous litigation over the question whether the federal lease sale conforms "to the maximum extent practicable" to the state coastal management plan.

Nearly every lease

sale held subsequent to CA9's decision has been challenged, and
the DC in Massachusetts recently held that the Secretary failed
to satisfy his substantive burden of establishing consistency,
notwithstanding a 30-page agency opinion.
Resps are wrong that the Department of Justice took the position that lease sales were subject to §307 (c) (1).

DOJ did dis-

agree with DOl's broad view of its exemption, but DOJ also disagreed with NOAA's construction of the word "directly affecting."
Resps continue to offer no definition of "directly" that gives it
any content.
B. The Cross-Petition
Cross-petrs -- This cross-petn is filed "out of an abundance
of caution to insure that arguments dealing with that portion of
the Ninth Circuit's opinion examining the phrase 'to the maximum
extent practicable' can be presented to the Court in the event
(

that it grants certiorari to review the question presented by the

I

Solicitor General and WOGA."

1•

Cross-Pet. at 5 (emphasis in origi-

.J..Je

nal).
CA9

should

not

extent practicable"

have construed

the phrase "to the maximum

in this case, for the issue will not become

ripe unless and until DOI makes a consistency determination, the
State decides how to respond, and the Secretary of Commerce mediates any dispute that may arise.
were ripe,

CA9 erred

Furthermore, even if the issue

in suggesting that the Federal Government

has ultimate power to override the state coastal management plan
in the event of a conflict.
Cross-resps -- The SG does not oppose the granting of the
conditional cross-petition.
~

WOGA opposes
Court

the granting of the cross-petition.

reverses CA9' s

construction of

If this

"directly affecting,"

the

issue raised in the cross-petition will have little significance.
On the other hand, if the Court agrees in whole or in part with
CA9, the Court "will have ample opportunity to discuss the issue
of concern to respondents/cross-petitioners in the context of the
issues raised by petitioners."
DISCUSSION:

Response at 3.

It seems doubtful that review is warranted

on the ground that the legal issue raised has any general significance.

Only · one statute
-

that other federal

is
Awz

statute~

and there is no conflict.

af

.....,_,.-,'-

issue~ ·

there

..BJNI~
test~ ~ ·

is no allegation

'

have the same "direct effects"

Thus, the case for cert must rest on a

view that (i) CA9 may well be wrong, and (ii) the subject matter
of the litigation .is of sufficient national importance to warrant
{

correction of the possible error.
The correctness of CA9's decision is not certain.

I agree

~

with the SG that it is hard to find
r ~lJ "

under

CA9' s

construction.

The

definitions

of· "direct

effects" and "indirect effects" in the NEPA regulations seem more
in accord with the usual construction of those phrases.
the result

is somewhat inconsistent with the OCSLA.

Also,

OCSLA re-

quires that DOI consider the State Governor's recommendations on
the

"size,

§1345.

timing,

and

location"

of

lease

sales.

43

u.s.c.

Yet CA9 found that §307 (c) (1) 's consistency requirement

must apply at the lease sale stage because "critical decisions
are made as to the size and location of the tracts, the timing of
the sale, and the stipulations to which the leases woulo be subject."
(

(SG's Pet.

Normally a court should construe

at 13a.)

related statutes in a manner that avoids such a substantial over~

I

C:f'l:Z:.~_
,~~-""

lap.

On the other hand, I reject the SG's suggestjon that this is )
----...-.
~

a case where a CA has gone wild in reading its policy preferences
into a statute.
and defensible.

--

CA9's construction of the statute is reasoned
Moreover,

the court expressly rejected the no-

~

tion

shelf

that

a

state

development,

whether

consistency

unilaterally could
as

it

held

exists

to

thwart outer

that

final

authority

the

maximum

extent

continental
to decide
practicable

"must reside ~----------------------------------in the Executive Branch of the feder al government
subject, of course,

to such judicial review as is appropriate.

To hold otherwise on the basis of silence, or at best attenuated
inferences drawn from the language of Congress, weighs too lightly the interests of the nation against that of a state."
Pet. at 19a-20a.)

(SG Is

•.. ;

A.

.l::>.

Petrs contend that CA9's decision still will cause delays in
leasing, and that the courts may prevent the Secretary from exercising his "final authority" by overturning his decisions on judicial review.

These are valid points borne out by the number of

suits filed challenging the Secretary's determination of consistency and by the decision in D. Mass. holding that the consistency determination prepared for OCS Lease Sale No. 52 (North Atlantic) failed to prove consistency to the maximum extent practicable.

(See cases cited in SG's Reply at 3-4.)

that quest ions concerning

( i)

But I would note

the final authority of the Secre-

tary in making consistency determinations and ( i i)

the standard

of judicial review of those determinations are different from the
.(

narrower question presented here as to whether the Secretary must
make such a determination at all. · The Court may well want to
review the former issues, but this is not the case in which to do
so.
I

therefore

think

the Court should '1eny'\ these petitions.
~

This

case

involve ~

._....__.

~~

..

complex statutes, and CA9' s construction,
._...._.........
while not free from doubt, is a reasonable one. If Congress does
.'-"""'

~---------------------------not
think so, it may act to change the statute by expressly providing that lease sales are exempt from §307 (c) (1).
suspect

that,

given

the

strong

Indeed, I

interests on either side,

the

issue ' \ ill be brought back to the Congress no matter how this
case comes out.
If cert is granted in the main petitions, the conditional
cross-petition should be granted.

The Court presumably would

want to consider the meaning of §307(c) (1) in its entirety, and a

grant of the cross-petition would ensure that the "to the maximum
extent practicable" standard would be before the Court.
WOGA has

requested that

the case be expedited and set for

argument at the earliest possible time.
grants cert,

I

recommend

In the event the Court

that the case be set for

argument

in

October.
RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend denial of all petitions.

In No. 82-1326 there is a response and a reply.
1327 there is a response and a reply.

In No. 82-

In No. 82-1511 there are

two responses.
04/26/83

{

Newell

Opinion in petn

men

04/26/83

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
May 12, 1983 Conference
List 1, Sheet 2
No. 82-1511-CFX

Cert to CA9 (Sneed, Tang,
Pregerson)

California, et al.

v.
Federal/Civil

Watt, et al.

Timely

Please see memo in No. 82-1326, with which this conditional
cross-petition is curve-lined.
I recommend denial.
There are two responses.
04/26/83

Newell

Opinion in petn

men

04/26/83

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
May 12, 1983 Conference
List 1, Sheet 2
No. 82-1327-CFX

Cert to CA9 (Sneed, Tang,
Pregerson)

Western Oil & Gas Ass'n, et al.

v.
California, et al.

Federal/Civil

Timely

Please see the memo in No. 82-1326, with which this case is
curve-lined.
I recommend denial.
There is a response and a reply.

,
I

/

"-----"
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Newell
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Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned ................. . , 19 .. .
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excellent

filed by Covington & Burling on behalf of Western
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In
granted

1953

Congress

coastal states

enacted

legislation

the ownership of

submerged

that
lands

within three miles of their coasts, but reserved for the
federal government proprietary control over the soil and
seabed of the outer continental shelf
of

(OCS)

the coastal zone granted the states.

i.e. outs ide

In view of the

national policy underlying this major legislation,
argued

that

no

subsequent

statutes

should

be

it is

read

as

increasing the authority of states over the coastal zone
absent quite explicit language.

The two statutes primarily involved here are the
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
Continental
§307 (c) (1)

Shelf
thereof

directly affecting

Lands
-

Act

provides

(CZMA)

and the Outer

(OCSLA) .
that

The

federal

CZMA

"activities

the coastal zone" are subject to the

substantive requirement that they be conducted in a manner
consistent

"to

the

maximum

extent

practicable"

with

an

approved state coastal zone management program.
The specific question is whether the substantive
consistency
oil

and

requirement of

gas

lease

§307 (c) (1)

applies

sale conducted pursuant

to an OCS

to

the Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act when that sale has no physical
impact upon the coastal zone but merely sets in motion a
chain

of

events

that

may

eventually

result

in

such

an

impact.
All that has been done by the federal government
up to this time is the granting of leases to the highest
qualified

bidders

Respondents

-

of

substantial

particularly

the

state

offshore
of

acreage.

California and

environmental groups - brought suit to require, before any
leases were made, a showing by the federal government that
the activity on the outer
the

maximum

extent

shelf

practicable"

is to be consistent "to
with

the

coastal

zone

·.

..
. f'[1o

\.

management
argued,

program

approved

and CA9 agreed,

by

California.

Respondents

that the federal government must

make this showing at the initial step (i.e., the leasing),
as

this

commences

adversely

the

a

chain

of

events

interest

state's

that

under

may

affect

approved

its

management program.
Petitioner
the

leases

answers,

authorize

and that further

extremely

I

think,

limited

that

activities,

federal approval is required at each of(
(i)

three other stages:
to

only

persuasively

development;

and

prior to exploration;

(iii)

prior

to

(ii) prior

actual

production.

Interior

Department,

(See SG's brief p. 7).
Under

regulations

of

the

the holder of a lease is limited to conduct "preliminary

ocs.

activities" on the
"geophysical

and

other

These activities are defined as
surveys

necessary

to

develop

a

comprehensive exploration plan" so long as such activities
"do not result in any physical penetration of the seabed
of

greater

and

than

300

"do not result

feet

of

unconsolidated

formations",

in any significant adverse

the natural resources of the OCS".

impact on

At the leasing stage,

it is argued that possible future effects on the coastal
zone

are

not

predictable,

and

in

any

event

do

not

"directly affect the coastal zone".

Only the subsequent

activities - exploration, development and production - may
directly affect the coastal zone.
The

petitioners

rely

on

the

plain

language,

legislative history and the paramount national interest in
urging

reversal

decision would

of

CA9.

It

unduly expand

is

pointed

the

out

that

CA9 's

substantive control by

the states over energy development activities on the outer
continental shelf.

Congress did not intend to grant

t~

7J...;..-- W&**<.

states a veto over the issuance of an OSC

lease. ~~ 7-;

~- ~l-~cA7>
The respondents advance the same arguments that ~.

were accepted by CA9.
in

§307 (c) (1)

"to

the

In a word, they rely on the phrase
maximum

extent

practicable"

and

contend that this requires a demonstration of substantive
consistency at every stage of the oil and gas activities
on the outer shelf.
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David A. Charny

October 29, 1983
Questions Presented

(1) Whether the sale of outer continental shelf leases

-

by the Secretary of the Interior is in this case a federal

-

activity "directly affecting the coastal zone" under section

...

307(c) (1) of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16

u.s.c.

§

1456 (c) (1).
(2) If the sale is subject to section 307(c) (1), by what

criteria~~·~e wAe~ld

be determined to be consistent with the

"'

state coastal zone management plan "to the maximum extent
practicable," as required by that section.
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I. Background
A. Statutory Background
The Coastal Zone Management Act (the CZMA), whose
as designed to

interpretation is at

encourage the states to implement programs to preserve the
natural environment of coast waters and adjacent shoreland.

The

Submerged Lands Act had granted submerged lands within three
miles of the coast to the states, while retaining to the federal
government control of the remaining outer continental shelf. See
43

u.s.c.

§§

130l(a) (2)

~

1311.

Consistent with this delegation,

the CZMA encouraged the states to establish management programs
for the coastal waters and required any federal agency whose
activities "directly affect[] the coastal zone to conduct
to the maximum extent

those activities in a manner

practicable consistent with" the state program.
307 (c) (1), codified at 16

u.s.c.

§

Section

1456 (c) (1).

The CZMA also addresses the activities of private
individuals whose conduct is subject to federal approval.
Section 307(c) (3) (A), 16

u.s.c.

§

1456(c) (3) (A), requires

applicants for federal licenses or permit to certify that their
activities are consistent with state management programs.
Subpar. B of that subsection requires leaseholders of mineral
interests under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to certify
consistency with state programs before embarking upon
exploration, development, or production under the lease.
The second statute relevant to this case is the Outer

...

,,

statute provides for the leasing of the outer continental shelf
for mineral production and establishes a comprehensive system of
federal and state approval for each step of the process of
exploiting the minerals -- exploration, development and
production.

43

u.s.c.

§

1337.

The first steps of the leasing

process are the development of a five-year leasing program, id.
1344(a), and the consideration of bids by the Secretary, id.
1337(a).

§

§

At each of these steps, the Secretary must consider

comments on his proposals submitted by governors of states whose
coastal areas might be affected.
The present case presents the questions whether
Secretary's decision
,.....----._

t~

/I (

'\

lease a tract is subject to the section

307(c) (1) requirement of maximum practicable consistency with
state coastal management programs, and, if so, what is the proper
interpretation of that requirement.
B. Facts and Proceedings Below
This litigation arose from California's efforts to
prevent the Interior Department from selling oil and gas leases
for tracts off the coast of California. After the Interior
Department had begun selecting specific tracts for the sale, the
California Coastal Commission requested the Secretary of the
Interior to prepare ' a consistency determination to accompany the
proposed notice of sale.

When the Secretary issued the notice,

he informed the Commission that it had determined that the lease
sale would have not "direct effects" on the coastal zone, so that
a consistency determination under section 307(c) (1) was not
required.

'.

'

•

~ I.

As provided by the OCSLA, the governor of California
submitted recommendations that certain tracts be deleted from the
sale.

The Secretary determined, however, that "overriding

national interest" required that the lease sale proceed as
originally planned.
California then sought an injunction in DC, contending
that the Secretary was required to prepare a consistency
determination under section 307(c) (1) before conducting the lease
sale.

The DC found that there was "ample evidence within the

~L)<

~

/1

administrative record" ~ di~ _;f_!e~t~ on the coas~ zone. ~
Petn, at 7la.

Examples of such effects included:

_

operation of

boats and aircraft by lessees; possible oilspills; the effects of
pipelaying, drilling construction and

s~wage

discharge on water

quality, marine life, and nearby recreational facilities; the
impact on the region of labor migrating to the area to work on
oil and gas operations.

';li

\'

The DC ~nnulled any bids
... received for

the tracts and any leases awarded and enjoined the Secretary from
conducting the lease sale "until such time as rpetrs] comply with
the requirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act by conducting
a consistency determination on the tracts at issue and by
conducting all activities on these tracts in a manner consistent
with California's Coastal Management Plan."
The CA affirmed the DC's holding and modified its

-

injunction.

----

lj

The CA agreed that the lease sale directly affected

the coastal zone, citing the DC's list of effects and concluding
that "decisions [at this stage] establish the basic scope •••
[of] subsequent development and production . . • . [C]ritical

be.
-

decisions are made as to the size and location of the tracts, the
timing of the sale, and the stipulation to which
be subject."

Petn, at 14a.

~ leases

would

The CA found, howeve h 4 hat bids

t: fit{

should not be cancelled until the Secretary had an opportunity to ---conduct a consistency determination on the lease sale ?3'Fur ther,
the CA vacated those portions of the injunction that required the
Secretary to conduct his activities consistent with California's

-------~----------------------------------------------

coastal management plan.

Rather, section 307(c) (1) required the

Secretary to act consistently with

th~

"to the maximum

extent practicable," taking into account such factors as the
extent to which exploitation of mineral resources would be
hampered by conformity, the reasonableness of the state plan, and
the terms of the lease sale.

Petn, at 24a.

II. Discussion
A. Meaning of "Directly Affect"

;P..t.a.L~ #A~-A~..t.J-' ~/~L-~/~~
~~

~,-·~-7

1. Statutory Language and Structure. -- This controversy
cannot be resolved by reference to the "plain meaning" of section
307 (c) (1).

The use of the term "directly" indicates that not all

effects are to be considered in deciding whether a consistency
determination is required.

But what effects are sufficiently

immediate to be "direct" is a question of degree which can only
be resolved by considering the

~ Congress

intended to

advance by this provision.
The structural relationship between the CZMA and the
OCSLA gives some indication of the scope of "directly affect."
The CZMA itself distinguishes between activities by federal
agencies -- to which the section 307(c) (1) consistency

.

'

...

requirement applies -- and activities of private individuals
under federal license-- to which section 307(c) (3) applies.

In

particular, as noted above, section 307(c) (3) (B) requires oil and
gas lessees to certify consistency with state management programs
before receiving permission to explore, develop or produce gas
and oil under their leases.

The absence of a corresponding

provision for section 307(c) (1) is not itself conclusive:
Congress may have thought that section clearly applicable by its
terms to federal activities about leasing, and it is conceded

-

that section 307(c) (1) 's term "federal activities" embraces
federal leasing decisions.

WOGA Brief, at 26 n.l9.

...--

See also

Joint Appendix, at 37-45 (opinion of the Office of Legal

-

Counsel).
However, that these subsequent private activities are

..

subject to consistency review indicates that Congress did not
intend to place the entire burden of determining compliance with
state programs on the initial federal decision to lease for oil
and gas development.

As the government suggests, the "directly

affecting" provison ·would determine at what stage of the leasing
process

initial lease sale, or permit to explore, develop, or

extract

:§environmental impacts of the lease are to be

considered.

The legislative history and the policies underlying

the statute confirm that this point is the key to applying the
"directly affecting" language to the present case.
2. Legislative History. -- The legislative history of
these provisions contains no express indication of what Congress

specifically intended in choosing the "directly affecting"
language or in its subsequent amendments of CZMA and OCSLA.
1971 Bill.

Congress first considered the Coastal Zone
C.P_p~_

Management Act in 1971.

Resps- Fely heavily on the Senate Report

on the proposed bill, which indicates that federal programs
having a "functional interrelationship from an economic, social,
or geographic standpoint with waters within the coastal zone
should be administered consistent with the approved state
management programs."

S. Rep. 92-526, at 20, 30.

However, the

proposed bill in 1971, never acted on by either House, did not
contain the "directly affecting" provision.

By its terms, it

imposed consistency requirements only on federal activities
conducted "within the coastal ..• zone."
313(a) of proposed bill).

Id., at 7 (section

The Committee's statement indicates

only that activities within the zone will have to be consistent
with state programs insofar as they have an impact on those
programs; it does not contemplate extending the requirement to
federal activities outside of the coastal zone.
1972 Act.

The next step in the legislative history is

the passage in 1972 of the Coastal Zone Management Act.

Neither

the Senate nor the House bill applied consistency requirements to
federal activities "directly affecting" state coasts; rather, the
bills applied to activities within state coastal zones.

Neither

the Senate nor the House reports therefore sheds light on the
meaning of the phrase.
The SG speculates that the "directly affecting" language
was a compromise on the question, on which the House and Senate

..
,....

.

'

differed, whether federal activities on federal lands within the
coastal zone were included in the Act.

Under the compromise,

these federal activities are included in the Act provided they
have the requisite "direct effects."

The difficulty with this

speculation is that this provision not only "compromises" the
narrow question that the SG proposed it was intended to address,

I

but also changes the entire focus of the statute by deleting the
requirement that the activities be within the coastal zone at
all.

Perhaps the Conference Committee, in attempting to resolve

the narrow issue, realized that it made more sense to define the

J ,.,

}

scope of the statute by reference to the impact rather than the
location of the federal activities in question.

~

~~-j-' \'
~

In any case, the

1\

Conference Report is silent on these problems; and the history of

1-o

~~·

the language itself does not indicate whether "directly
affecting" is to receive a narrow or broad reading.
~ 76 Amendments.

The next step in the legislative

~~

The amendments added ~~ •• ~,

process is the 1976 amendment of the CZMA.

to section 307(c) (3) new subpar. (B), which sets out procedures
for compliance of oil and gas lessees with state management
programs during exploration, development and production on the
lease.

As I have noted above, these provisions are critical
~ ------------------~---because they reflect congressional intent as to when the
consistency determination should be made.

The legislative

history confirms this point, but does not advert specifically to
the interpretation of "directly

affec~ed."

.

First, the Senate and House committees both recommended
amending section 307(c) to impose on applicants for federal

..

,f,.

J
~

leases the same consistency requirements imposed on applicants
for federal licenses and permits.

As the Senate explained, the

1

Secretary of the Interior would have had to seek certification of
consistency before entering into binding lease agreements.
Rep. No. 94-227, at 19-20.

S.

The Interior Department opposed the

amendment because it required a consistency determination before
the effects of mineral operations could realistically be assessed
and because it would by its terms apply to every one of the
myriad of permits that a lessee might at various points be
required to obtain.

On the floor of the House, the amendment was

deleted in response to these concerns.

122 Cong. Rec. 6128

(1976).
The Conference Committee resolved this difference
between the Senate and the House by adopting the current
of the CZMA, section 307(c) (3) (B).

version ~

The Committee explains

its purpose was "specifically [to] appl[y] the consistency
requirement to the basic steps in the .•• leasing process,"
thereby providing the states with "complete information on a
timely basis" about offshore drilling.

The amendment was

designed to accommodate the government's concern about which
steps in the leasing process would be subject to consistency
determinations and about proper timing of the consistency
determination.
1978 Amendments to the OCSLA.

In 1978, Congress amended

the OCSLA to refer to the consistency requirements it had already
written into the CZMA.

Further, Congress added procedures to

enable states to participate in the Secretary's leasing

,,

..
,.
•'

..

decisions: governors submit recommendations which the Secretary
must accept if "reasonable."

u.s.c.

Section 19 of OSCLA, 43

§

1345.
Arguably, this provision might have exempted the
Secretary from the additional requirements of the CZMA, section
307(c) (1).

For it seems redundant to require the Secretary to

consider the consistency of his proposals with the state's
coastal management plan when he must consider the state
government's recommendations in any event.
the reasoning of the

However, I agree with

P/71

Office of Legal Counsel that the amendments
A

-

to the OCSLA do not accomplish such an implied repeal.
at 44-45.

See J.A.,

First, section 608(a) of the 1978 OCSLA amendments

indicates that nothing in the amendments should be construed to
repeal the CZMA.

Second, given the explicit and careful cross-

references from the amendments to the CZMA, it is hard to believe ~

~·-

that Congress intended to repeal a section of that Act by
implication.

Third, the House report on the amendments indicates

that "lease sales and approval of development and product plans
must comply with 'consistency' requirements ••• ,"and disclaims
any intent to modify the CZMA in this respect.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-

590, at 153 n.52.
1980 Report.

In 1980, Congress adopted further

amendments to the CZMA not directly relevant here.

The House

report on these amendments does contain an interpretation of
"directly affecting the coastal zone."

The Committee cites with

approval the "functional interrelationship" test formulated in
the 1971 report.

~\·

~· ~1-f..f/V\-

-·

Consistency requirements should apply when "the

management program's policies are likely to apply to the
[Federal] activity" or "when a Federal agency initiates a series
of egents of coastal management consequence."

H. Rep. 96-1012,

~t...~'~

at 34.

--

Although the Court has sometimes given

weigh~

~

to

~~~

subsequent legislative history, such history must be 1nterpre~~. ~

"wi~rr extreme care."

n.8 (1980).
weight.

Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446

u.s.

657, 666

~ ·
W

The House report is entitled to relatively little

The committee acknowledged that the interpretation of

the "directly affecting" language was "uncertain," and cited the
disagreement between California and the Interior
has given rise to this suit.

Department that

The committee pointedly chose not

to attempt to pass a clarifying amendment, and referred instead
to Dept. of Commerce mediation of such disputes and to new
regulations to be issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the agency charged with administering the
statute.

In these circumstances, to give substantial weight to

the committee report would permit the committee unilaterally to
amend the statute.
3. Administrative Regulations. -- The NOAA regulations
offer no guidance in interpreting the statute.
first a broad

de~on

of, "di-;;ctly arfecting'" 43 Fed. Reg.

10510, 10511, 10519 (1978)
and cumulative

effects")~

26658, 26659 (1981)
coastal zone").

The NOAA adopted

("significantly,""primary, secondary
and then a narrow one, 46 Fed. Reg.

("measurable physical alteration in the

Both definitions were withdrawn following

expressions of legislative and executive disapproval.

!<io:'

~·

,. '

4. Policy Considerations. -- As a matter of policy, the
terms "directly affecting" should be interpreted to further
rational administration of the leasing procedures taken as a
whole.

As the government contends, the CZMA should not be

construed to require premature consideration of environmental
/

impacts for whose evaluation Congress has specifically provided
at a later stage of the leasing process.

Such a construction

would fail to give proper effect to the specific provisions of
the CZMA governing exploration, development and extraction on
leased tracts; and would require the government to make
predictions regarding environmental impact based on pure
speculation even though it would do no harm to postpone analysis
of environmental effects until more accurate assessments could be
made.

As noted above, this approach to section 307(c) (1) is

supported by the structure of the statute and the legislative
hi~,

particularly of the 1976 and 1978 amendments.

~)tvaluation of some decisions made by the Secretary when
'\

deciding which leases to sell should not be postponed.

For

example, if the Department is trying to choose between leasing
one of two different tracts, the choice between the two tracts
should be made consistently with coastal management policy "to
the maximum extent practicable," as the CZMA requires.

It would

be wasteful to proceed with exploration and development of one
tract, only to discover at a later stage that the other tract
could have been developed as efficiently but also more
consistently with the state coastal management plan.

The

Secretary's plans as to what leases to sell "directly affect" the

bench memo:

Calif0~nia

v. Watt

page 14.

coastal zone insofar as these plans commit the Department to
immediate development of some, but not other, tracts.

To this

limited extent only, a consistency determination should be
required.
B. Appropriate Remedy
Because the CA required a consistency determination, its
judgment should be affirmed to that extent.

However, the Court's

--------------------------------------------

opinion should make clear that such a determination is required

-

only because of, and only with respect to, those aspects of the
..,.,..-

Department's planning decisions
Department to a course of
/(

leased.

acti~n

that 1~rrevocably

commit the

regarding choice of tracts to be

.,,

Impacts which inevitably result from any further

"'
development would also have
to be considered.

But the Department

need not consider impacts that are unduly speculative and that
may be controlled at a later stage.

For example, the risk of oil

spills will not eventuate if only gas is produced on a lease, and
in any case may be controlled by safety devices.

Applying this

standard, the Secretary may determine again on remand that the
leasing decision here has not "direct effect" on California's
coastal management plan.
Further, theCA correctly set out general standards as

'-----------------------------~-------------

to the procedure for consistency determinations.

The CA had to

~---~-------------------------------------reach
this issue in order to determine that the appropriate
remedy in this case was a remand to the Secretary for a
consistency determination. And the CA correctly concluded that
11
· 1 respons1· b 1· 1 1ty
·
\\to d eterm1ne
·
~
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wh et
leasing program is consistent with state coastal management plans
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coastal zone insofar as these plans commit the Department to
immediate development of some, but not other, tracts.

To this

limited extent only, a consistency determination should be
required.
B. Appropriate Remedy
Because the CA required a consistency determination, its
judgment should be affirmed to that extent.

However, the Court's

----------------------------------------

opinion should make clear that such a determination is required

---

only because of, and only with respect to, those aspects of the

-

Department's planning decisions
Department to a course of
leased.

I (

acti~n

that 1~rrevocably

commit the

regarding choice of tracts to be

'I'

Impacts which inevitably result from any further
,;

development would also have to be considered.

But the Department

need not consider impacts that are unduly speculative and that
may be controlled at a later stage.

For example, the risk of oil

spills will not eventuate if only gas is produced on a lease, and
in any case may be controlled by safety devices.

Applying this

standard, the Secretary may determine again on remand that the
leasing decision here has not "direct effect" on California's
coastal management plan.
Further, theCA correctly set out general standards as
to the procedure for consistency determinations.

The CA had to

~---~--------------~---------'------------

reach this issue in order to determine that the appropriate
remedy in this case was a remand to the Secretary for a
consistency determination.
t he

11

s ecre t ary

And the CA correctly concluded that

h as f 1na
· 1 respons1· b 1· 1 1ty
·
\\to d eterm1ne
·
---::::..
h er t h e
wh et

leasing program is consistent with state coastal management plans

~

-

"to the maximum extent practicable."

While section 307 (c) (1)

imposes a substantive requirement on the Secretary's decision, it

~~

contains absolutely no indication of a congressional intent to
modify the Secretary's authority to make final leasing decisions
as established under the OCSLA.

See 43

u.s.c.

§

~

1334(a) (1).

Further, the OCSLA sets out specific procedures for state

~

..

agenc~
~

-

participation in leasing decisions, and it would be anomalous to ~ i ~
~
consider that section 307(c) (1) provided in addition for a veto ~
by the states.

A major transfer of responsibility from a federa ;

agency to the states cannot be accomplished by congressional
silence.
As to the substance of the "maximum extent practicable"
standard, the CA correctly observed that the limits the standard
imposes "cannot be precisely delineated.

[V]erbal formulas

cannot eliminate the necessity of examing each situation with
care and sensitivity to the concerns of the state and the
nation."

Petn, at 24a.

Because the Secretary did not undertake

a consistency determination, there is no administrative record

------------------

and no finding by the Secretary as to the meaning or application
of the statutory standard.

The case thus clearly differs from

those in which the courts set forth appropriate standards on the
basis of an administrative record and an agency decision which is
under review.

E.g., California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1311-1313

(D.C. Cir. 1981); Louisiana Environmental Society, Inc. v.
Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 86 (5th Cir. 1976).
The question of the substantive meaning of "maximum
extent practicable" is not ripe for further consideration.

See

~~

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387

u.s.

136, 148-156 (1967).

First, it is not a purely legal issue in this case, for it
depends upon application of the statute to the Secretary's
leasing program as it affects California's coast management plan.
Evaluations of practicability will depend heavily upon the facts
and circumstances that may not yet be reflected in the record and
that should be evaluated in the first instance by the Secretary.
Further, the Secretary has taken no "final agency action" on the
application of the standard, for he has not yet made a
consistency determination in this case.

Finally, it is not clear

that any hardship to the parties would be adverted by abstract
pronouncements by the Court at this time.
III. Conclusion
TheCA's judgment should be affirmed.

However, the

Court should make clear that the DC and the CA adopted too
expansive an approach to defining impacts "directly affecting" a
state's coastal management plan.

Such impacts comprise only

those which cannot be prevented by regulation at a later stage of
the leasing process.

The case should be remanded to the

Secretary to apply this criterion to the tracts to be leased
here.
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